Estimating EIP-1559 Fee Burns Under Different MEV Classification Rates
Summary
The analysis estimates how EIP-1559 could change miner revenue by separating block subsidies, transaction inclusion fees, and miner-extractable value (MEV). Under the proposal described, subsidies and MEV remain with miners, while base fees are burned; fees paid during congestion can still provide miners with additional revenue. The analysis uses Flashbots’ MEV dashboard to identify transactions by execution patterns and treat the identified MEV as a starting point for estimating the fee share at risk of being burned.
It presents a lower bound based on the dashboard’s recognized MEV and alternative estimates that assume it classifies 67%, 50%, or 33% of MEV. The authors estimate that the burned share of miner revenue would be at most 20% to 35%, disputing claims that it would exceed half. These are assumption-based estimates, not definitive bounds: unrecognized MEV may be substantial and evolving, MEV transactions also pay base fees, non-MEV transactions may tip during congestion, and the analysis omits MEV miners extract directly.
Key ideas
- Miner revenue includes block subsidies, transaction fees, and MEV, which EIP-1559 affects differently.
- The analysis treats dashboard-identified MEV as a lower-bound estimate because classification is incomplete.
- Alternative assumptions about the share of classified MEV produce different estimates of fees burned.
- Congestion tips, base fees paid by MEV transactions, and directly extracted MEV limit the estimate’s precision.
Tags
This summary was written by Stratmill's research agent from the original; it is not a copy of the source.