How Finite-Horizon Utility Changes Optimal Kelly Bets
Summary
This note examines whether the optimal Kelly betting fraction should change when the number of rounds is finite. For independent bets with fixed win and loss sizes, it derives expected utility across repeated rounds under several utility functions. With logarithmic utility, the expected log wealth scales with the round count, so the maximizing fraction remains the same as for one round. The note reaches the same round-count independence for power utility and gives an expression for the optimal fraction under that preference family.
For a general utility function, it expresses the optimum through a fixed-point condition involving a utility-weighted pseudo-probability. It reports that exponential utility can make the optimum depend on the number of rounds, but offers no closed-form relationship, only a suggestion to solve numerically. The conclusions rely on independent, identically distributed outcomes, fixed per-round fractions, and the stated utility assumptions; they do not establish a universal finite-horizon adjustment or address changing opportunities and constraints.
Key ideas
- With independent bets and logarithmic utility, the optimal fraction does not depend on the number of rounds.
- Power utility also yields an optimal fraction that is independent of the round count under the stated setup.
- For general utility, the optimal fraction can be written using a utility-weighted pseudo-probability that depends on the fraction itself.
- The note says exponential utility may produce round-count dependence, but does not derive its form.
Tags
Full text
# Kelly Criterion for finite rounds
# Kelly Criterion for finite rounds
I understand that the Kelly criterion maximizes long-term utility under a log-wealth function, but from what I've gathered, this is only true if we have an arbitrarily high number of betting rounds. My question is: Is there a way to adapt the Kelly strategy for a finite number of rounds? For example, say, a game offering 2:1 odds, with a 50% probability of winning; Kelly's formula gives (2 * 0.5 - 0.5)/2 = 0.25 of our wealth to be bet on this game, per round.
Specifically, I am asking two things:
- If we had something like 10 rounds of betting, how should our bets change under the underlying framework of maximizing "long-term" wealth over the course of 20 rounds? Should we be more conservative, using a half-Kelly bet or quarter-Kelly bet, or should we be more aggressive, since intuitively we have no more potential gains after the 10th round of betting?
- If we had a single round of betting, how would our single bet change? At this point, does it depend solely on one's individual utility function and risk aversion? For example, I'm thinking that someone with no risk aversion would just bet their entire bankroll on this bet in a single round, since the expected value is positive. Are all responses that are consistent with a certain risk-utility framework then rational?
Thanks!
## Answer by Kermittfrog (score 3)
https://quant.stackexchange.com/a/80219
Given independently and identically distributed betting outcomes $G$ (gain) with probability $p$ and $L$ (loss) with probability $1-p$, whether or not the optimal betting fraction $f$ is a function of the total number of bets $n$ depends on the structure of the utility function.
Under logarithmic and power utility, the fraction is independent of $n$ as we will show below. For exponential power utility, I cannot prove the dependency in closed form, but provide a quick way to check for yourself.
### Logarithmic utility
Under logarithmic utility and given independent bets, the optimal betting size is independent of the number of rounds.
Let's take the thoughts in Wiki's proof of the Kelly criterion as a starting point.
Assuming logarithmic utility, $u=\ln(w)$ and $n$-round gambling with fixed win probability per round $p$,a fixed investment fraction per round $f$, as well as gains $G$ and losses $L$, we have a binomially distributed final wealth - and hence log utility. The expected utility is:
$$ \begin{align} \mathrm{EU}(f)&=\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}\ln\left((1+fG)^k(1-fL)^{n-k}\right)\\ &=\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}\left[k\ln(1+fG)+(n-k)\ln(1-fL)\right]\\ &=\ln(1+fG)\sum_{k=0}^nk{n\choose k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}+\ln(1-fL)\sum_{k=0}^n(n-k){n\choose k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}\\ &=np\mathrm{ln}(1+fG)+n(1-p)\ln(1-fL)\\ &=n\left(p\mathrm{ln}(1+fG)+(1-p)\ln(1-fL)\right) \end{align} $$
From here on we see that the derivation of the optimal $f$ is independent of the number of rounds played, $n$:
$$ \begin{align} \max_f \mathrm{EU}&\Rightarrow\frac{\partial \mathrm{EU}}{\partial f}\stackrel{!}{=}0\\ &\Rightarrow p\frac{G}{1+fG}-(1-p)\frac{L}{1-fL}\stackrel{!}{=}0\\ &\Rightarrow f^*=\frac{p}{L}-\frac{1-p}{G} \end{align} $$
### Power utility
Under power utility, $u=\frac{w^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha}$. Plugging this into the expected utility, we have
$$ \begin{align} \mathrm{EU}(f)&=\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}\left((1+fG)^k(1-fL)^{n-k}\right)^{1-\alpha}\\ &=\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}\left(p(1+fG)^{1-\alpha}\right)^k\left((1-p)(1-fL)^{1-\alpha}\right)^{n-k}\\ &\equiv \frac{1}{1-\alpha}\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}P^kQ^{n-k}\\ &=\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}\left(\frac{P+Q}{P+Q}P\right)^k\left(\frac{P+Q}{P+Q}Q\right)^{n-k}\\ &=\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\left(P+Q\right)^n\sum_{k=0}^n{n\choose k}\left(p^*\right)^k\left(1-p^*\right)^{n-k}\\ &=\frac{1}{1-\alpha}(P+Q)^n\\ &\equiv\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\left(p\left(1+fG\right)^{1-\alpha}+(1-p)\left(1-fL\right)^{1-\alpha}\right)^n \end{align} $$
Again, the optimum will be independent of $n$:
$$ f^*=\frac{\left[(1-p)L\right]^{-1/\alpha}}{G\left[pG\right]^{-1/\alpha}+L\left[(1-p)L\right]^{-1/\alpha}}-\frac{\left[pG\right]^{-1/\alpha}}{G\left[pG\right]^{-1/\alpha}+L\left[(1-p)L\right]^{-1/\alpha}} $$
### General formulation
In general, the optimal betting fraction maximizes the expected utility of future wealth $w(x)=(1+fG)^x(1-fL)^{n-x}$ given a random number of realizing a gain $x$ and corresponding number of losses $n-x$:
$$ f^*:\max_f\mathrm{E}\left(u\left[(1+fG)^x(1-fL)^{n-x}\right]\right) $$
Deriving and rearranging the first order condition yields
$$ \begin{align} f^*&=\frac{1}{L}\frac{\mathrm{E}\left[xw(x)u'(w(x))\right]}{n\mathrm{E}\left[w(x)u'(w(x))\right]}-\frac{1}{G}\frac{\mathrm{E}\left[(n-x)w(x)u'(w(x))\right]}{n\mathrm{E}\left[w(x)u'(w(x))\right]}\\ &\equiv \frac{\tilde{p}}{L}-\frac{1-\tilde{p}}{G} \end{align} $$
where $\tilde{p}$ can be interpreted as some pseudo probability. Note that the expectations depend on $f^*$ again, hence the solution can be understood as a fixed point equation.
Under exponential utility I find that the number of rounds is relevant for the optimal $f$. Alas, I cannot derive the relationship algebraically - only by solving the above fix point equation for various levels of $n$ and different assumptions on utility.Shown in full with attribution under the source's licence. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 (Stack Exchange)
This summary was written by Stratmill's research agent from the original; it is not a copy of the source.