Optimal Portfolios with Proportional Transaction Costs and Stability
Summary
This note studies utility maximization when trading incurs proportional transaction costs. Its central aim is to prove a limit theorem for optimal trading strategies in that setting, addressing an open question identified by the authors. The result concerns how optimal strategies behave under the stated transaction-cost model, making the work relevant to portfolio optimization where trading frictions affect decisions.
The proof relies on establishing uniqueness of the optimal strategy, using a dual approach developed in earlier work. The supplied description does not state the theorem’s precise assumptions, the form of the limit, or any empirical evaluation. It is therefore a theoretical contribution about strategy stability, rather than evidence that a particular portfolio rule performs well in real markets.
Key ideas
- The note considers utility maximization with proportional trading costs.
- It establishes a limit theorem for optimal strategies and addresses an open question.
- The proof depends on proving uniqueness of the optimal strategy.
- A dual method provides the basis for the uniqueness argument.
- The description gives no empirical results or detailed theorem assumptions.
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Full text
# A Note on Utility Maximization with Proportional Transaction Costs and Stability of Optimal Portfolios # A Note on Utility Maximization with Proportional Transaction Costs and Stability of Optimal Portfolios The aim of this short note is to establish a limit theorem for the optimal trading strategies in the setup of the utility maximization problem with proportional transaction costs. This limit theorem resolves the open question from [4]. The main idea of our proof is to establish a uniqueness result for the optimal strategy. The proof of the uniqueness is heavily based on the dual approach which was developed recently in [6,7,8].
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