Using CRRA Utility to Calculate a Gamble’s Risk Premium
Summary
The document asks how to use constant relative risk aversion utility to calculate the payment a person would accept to avoid an even-odds gamble. It also poses a second question about when a person with CRRA preferences rejects a gamble with a possible loss and a possible gain. The response illustrates a risk-premium calculation by equating utility at wealth reduced by the premium with expected utility across the two outcomes.
The example uses logarithmic utility and a stated wealth and gamble size, but its parameter identification is inconsistent: logarithmic utility corresponds to the limiting CRRA case of unit relative risk aversion, not the stated value of one half. The calculation therefore does not demonstrate the requested case as written. The response also does not address the general rejection condition in part (b). Readers should verify the utility specification and solve the indifference equation for the particular CRRA parameter and wealth constraints before relying on any computed premium.
Key ideas
- A risk premium can be found by equating utility after paying it with expected utility from the gamble.
- CRRA utility is parameterized by relative risk aversion, which determines how strongly risk is disliked.
- The worked example uses logarithmic utility despite stating a different CRRA parameter.
- The document does not derive the rejection condition posed in its second part.
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Full text
# Constant Relative Risk Aversion
# Constant Relative Risk Aversion
The question:
Consider a person with constant relative risk aversion p.
(a) Suppose the person has wealth of 100,000 and faces a gamble in which he wins or loses x with equal probabilities. Calculate the amount he would pay to avoid the gamble, for various values of p (say, between 0.5 and 40), and for x=100, x=1000, x=10,000 and x= 25000. For large gambles, do large values of p seem reasonable? What about small gambles?
(b) Suppose p > 1 and the person has wealth w. Suppose he is offered a gamble in which he loses x or wins y with equal probabilities. Show that he will reject the gamble no matter how large y is if p >= (log(0.5)+log(1-x/w))/log(1-x/w).
I'm not sure where to start with this. Am I solving for the risk premium and multiplying by w?
I know that for someone with CRRA utility u(w)= (1/(1-p))w^(1-p) and that an individual will pay pi(w) to avoid the gamble if u((1-pi)w)=E[u(1+epsilon tilda)w)]. But I'm not sure how to apply this information to solve the question. Any help is appreciated.
## Answer by Dachser (score 2, accepted)
https://quant.stackexchange.com/a/16447
if you have $p=0.5$ For example: $U(w)=ln(2w)$
why is that? relative risk aversion is given by
$$RRA=\frac{-wU''(w)}{U('w)}=\frac{-w*(-1/4w^2)}{1/2w}=0.5$$
Now you can apply your formula.
take for example: $x= 10000$ and $\pi=0.5=1-\pi.$ then expected utility is equal to
$EU(x,w)=0.5*ln(2*(w+x))+0.5*ln(2*(w-x))=0.5ln(220000)+0.5ln(180000)$
you want to know $RP:Risk~premium$
so you need to solve $U(w-RP)=EU(x,w)=0.5ln(220000)+0.5ln(180000)$
or $ln(200000-2RP)=12.20$
from which follows that $$RP=\frac{200000 -e^{12,2}}2=501.25$$
which is the amount the investor is ready to pay in order to avoid the gamble.Shown in full with attribution under the source's licence. Licence: CC BY-SA 4.0 (Stack Exchange)
This summary was written by Stratmill's research agent from the original; it is not a copy of the source.