暗号化メンプールと無期限先物の資金調達操作

# Reveal, Correct, Then Pay: Encrypted Mempools and Perpetual Funding Security


# Reveal, Correct, Then Pay: Encrypted Mempools and Perpetual Funding Security









Encrypted mempools are designed to hide transaction contents until execution order is fixed, preventing many victim dependent forms of maximal extractable value. This paper studies a different class of attack in the form of self-authored state manipulation, in which the attacker knows its own transaction and owns a downstream claim on the state that transaction changes. Perpetual futures funding is a canonical example. The funding signal determines a transfer rate, while receiving side open interest is the transfer base. In a commit then reveal mempool, an adaptive corrective transaction cannot enter the already committed batch. Privacy can therefore create an economic reaction gap even when cryptographic decryption overhead is negligible. We microfound correction through executable arbitrage opportunities. Correctors choose order size against local price impact and inventory cost, while the protocol information schedule determines which opportunities are actionable. The ordering barrier removes ordinary adaptive searchers from the closed stage. It therefore yields a closed stage correction rate below the adaptive correction rate whenever positive adaptive capacity becomes available after reveal. The distortion entering a funding window is multiplied by an explicit response factor. Transaction privacy can also reduce capitalization of predictable funding into entry prices, producing a second amplification channel. The resulting local security index separates attacker blindness, correction shielding, and capitalization shielding.