比特币-NG中的贪婪挖矿攻击与激励相容性
文章 arXiv papers · 作者: Junjie Hu et al.
总结
比特币-NG以一个关键区块和随后多个微区块构成每个纪元。其交易费分配规则会在当前和下一位领导者之间分配费用。文档指出，先前的激励分析忽略了更持久的对抗策略，以及出现高价值交易时改变挖矿行为的可能性。
文中提出贪婪挖矿策略，并将诚实矿工与攻击者之间的竞争建模为马尔可夫决策过程。分析考察了攻击者的额外奖励，以及该策略胜过诚实挖矿所需的算力条件。文中还描述了一项向后兼容的协议变更，用以提高传播因子阈值。模拟和实验据称表明比特币-NG易受攻击且不具激励相容性，但摘录未提供定量结果或实现细节。
核心观点
- 比特币-NG将纪元划分为关键区块和微区块，并在连续的领导者之间分配交易费。
- 文中提出贪婪挖矿策略，这是一种可能在高价值交易出现时改变挖矿行为的对抗策略。
- 研究使用马尔可夫决策过程分析诚实矿工与对手之间的竞争。
- 研究报告了激励问题的模拟和实验依据，但摘录没有给出数值结果。
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# Greedy-Mine: A Profitable Mining Attack Strategy in Bitcoin-NG # Greedy-Mine: A Profitable Mining Attack Strategy in Bitcoin-NG Bitcoin-NG is an extensible blockchain protocol based on the same trust model as Bitcoin. It divides each epoch into one Key-Block and multiple Micro-Blocks, effectively improving transaction processing capacity. Bitcoin-NG adopts a special incentive mechanism (i.e., the transaction fees in each epoch are split to the current and next leader) to maintain its security. However, there are some limitations to the existing incentive analysis of Bitcoin-NG in recent works. First, the incentive division method of Bitcoin-NG only includes some specific mining attack strategies of adversary, while ignoring more stubborn attack strategies. Second, once adversaries find a whale transaction, they will deviate from honest mining strategy to obtain extra reward. In this paper, we are committed to solving these two limitations. First, we propose a novel mining strategy named Greedy-Mine attack. Then, we formulate a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model to analyze the competition of honest miners and adversaries. Furthermore, we analysis the extra reward of adversaries and summarize the mining power proportion range required for malicious adversaries to launch Greedy-Mine to obtain extra returns. Finally, we make a backward-compatibility progressive modification to Bitcoin-NG protocol that would raise the threshold of propagation factor from 0 to 1. Meanwhile, we get the winning condition of adversaries when adopting Greedy-Mine, compared with honest mining. Simulation and experimental results indicate that Bitcoin-NG is not incentive compatible, which is vulnerable to Greedy-Mine attack.
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