工作量证明挖矿攻击的相互作用及其对激励的影响
文章 arXiv papers · 作者: Dinitha Wijewardhana et al.
总结
这篇系统性综述以比特币为主要背景，考察工作量证明共识机制和奖励系统面临的攻击。内容包括自私挖矿、双重支付和扣留区块，这些攻击可能损害区块链安全、运营效率或挖矿奖励的分配。
综述分析了单独发生的攻击，以及与其他攻击、网络层战术或诚实挖矿行为相结合的情况。文中还讨论了竞争矿池相互采取策略的情形，以及这可能如何影响其经济收益。论文提出设计指导，并指出了未来反制措施研究的方向。节选介绍了综述范围和动机，但未报告具体盈利估算、比较结果或详细建议。文章关注协议和矿工激励，而非交易策略，因此对交易者的主要参考价值在于理解加密货币网络和安全风险。
核心观点
- 工作量证明系统面临自私挖矿、双重支付和扣留区块等攻击。
- 攻击方法与其他策略结合可能改变攻击的有效性和盈利能力。
- 竞争矿池可能通过策略性挖矿行为影响彼此的经济收益。
- 综述将反制措施设计和未来研究作为应对这些威胁的方向。
标签
全文
# Examining Attacks on Consensus and Incentive Systems in Proof-of-Work Blockchains: A Systematic Literature Review # Examining Attacks on Consensus and Incentive Systems in Proof-of-Work Blockchains: A Systematic Literature Review Cryptocurrencies have gained popularity due to their transparency, security, and accessibility compared to traditional financial systems, with Bitcoin, introduced in 2009, leading the market. Bitcoin's security relies on blockchain technology - a decentralized ledger consisting of a consensus and an incentive mechanism. The consensus mechanism, Proof of Work (PoW), requires miners to solve difficult cryptographic puzzles to add new blocks, while the incentive mechanism rewards them with newly minted bitcoins. However, as Bitcoin's acceptance grows, it faces increasing threats from attacks targeting these mechanisms, such as selfish mining, double-spending, and block withholding. These attacks compromise security, efficiency, and reward distribution. Recent research shows that these attacks can be combined with each other or with either malicious strategies, such as network-layer attacks, or non-malicious strategies, like honest mining. These combinations lead to more sophisticated attacks, increasing the attacker's success rates and profitability. Therefore, understanding and evaluating these attacks is essential for developing effective countermeasures and ensuring long-term security. This paper begins by examining individual attacks executed in isolation and their profitability. It then explores how combining these attacks with each other or with other malicious and non-malicious strategies can enhance their overall effectiveness and profitability. The analysis further explores how the deployment of attacks such as selfish mining and block withholding by multiple competing mining pools against each other impacts their economic returns. Lastly, a set of design guidelines is provided, outlining areas future work should focus on to prevent or mitigate the identified threats.
在遵守原作品许可的前提下，附作者信息全文展示。 许可协议: abstract CC0
此摘要由 Stratmill 研究智能体根据原文撰写，并非原文副本。