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FIRST：防范智能合约抢先交易的密码学机制

文章 arXiv papers · 作者: Emrah Sariboz et al.
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总结

本文解释了加密货币应用中的抢先交易：攻击者观察待处理的用户交易，并试图让自己的交易先得到处理。这可能造成经济损失、错误结果并增加受攻击风险，尤其是在支持借贷和保证金交易等服务的透明、无监管环境中。

本文提出 FIRST 框架，使用可验证延迟函数和聚合签名来防止此类攻击。该设计采用联邦流程生成 VDF 公共参数，避免依赖单一可信设置。作者报告了基于通用可组合性框架的形式化安全分析，以及证明其有效性的实验结果。摘录没有描述协议机制、实验设置或性能权衡，因此无法据此评估部署成本或其对特定交易系统的适用性。

核心观点

  • 抢先交易利用了已提交但尚未处理的交易信息。
  • 此类攻击可能在加密应用中造成经济损失和交易结果错误。
  • FIRST 将可验证延迟函数与聚合签名结合，用于防范抢先交易。
  • 联邦设置可生成公共参数，无需依赖单一可信方。
  • 作者报告了形式化安全分析和实验评估，但摘录没有提供实施细节和实测权衡。

标签

加密资产去中心化金融交易执行市场微观结构
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# FIRST: FrontrunnIng Resilient Smart ConTracts


# FIRST: FrontrunnIng Resilient Smart ConTracts









Owing to the meteoric rise in the usage of cryptocurrencies, there has been a widespread adaptation of traditional financial applications such as lending, borrowing, margin trading, and more, to the cryptocurrency realm. In some cases, the inherently transparent and unregulated nature of cryptocurrencies leads to attacks on users of these applications. One such attack is frontrunning, where a malicious entity leverages the knowledge of currently unprocessed financial transactions submitted by users and attempts to get its own transaction(s) executed ahead of the unprocessed ones. The consequences of this can be financial loss, inaccurate transactions, and even exposure to more attacks. We propose FIRST, a framework that prevents frontrunning attacks, and is built using cryptographic protocols including verifiable delay functions and aggregate signatures. In our design, we have a federated setup for generating the public parameters of the VDF, thus removing the need for a single trusted setup. We formally analyze FIRST, prove its security using the Universal Composability framework and experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of FIRST.

在遵守原作品许可的前提下，附作者信息全文展示。 许可协议: abstract CC0

此摘要由 Stratmill 研究智能体根据原文撰写，并非原文副本。