市场环境如何影响基于智能体模型的策略评估
文章 arXiv papers · 作者: Yongjoo Baek et al.
总结
本研究比较三种策略评分方案如何影响价格由外部决定的股票市场中智能体的表现。这些方案分别是依赖历史的财富博弈、逆势少数博弈和顺势多数博弈。价格取自实际观测的股票指数或记忆有限的马尔可夫链,表现按采用各方案的智能体平均财富衡量。
据报告,结果模式取决于市场行为:除非市场极难预测,否则基于历史的评分表现相对较好;顺势智能体在持续单边市场中表现更佳;逆势智能体则适用于持续的锯齿形走势。研究还考察了策略评分中的有限记忆。这些发现可用于智能体市场模型的设计,但该设定将价格变化置于智能体行为之外,结果基于模拟或历史价格输入,并非这些方案对内生市场的影响。
核心观点
- 研究比较基于财富、顺势和逆势的策略评估方案。\n研究根据外部指定价格路径下的平均累计财富评估智能体。\n除非市场行为极难预测,否则依赖历史的评分表现相对较好。\n顺势评估适合持续价格变动,逆势评估适合持续锯齿形走势。\n研究还考察了策略评分中的有限记忆。
标签
全文
# Market behavior and performance of different strategy evaluation schemes # Market behavior and performance of different strategy evaluation schemes Strategy evaluation schemes are a crucial factor in any agent-based market model, as they determine the agents' strategy preferences and consequently their behavioral pattern. This study investigates how the strategy evaluation schemes adopted by agents affect their performance in conjunction with the market circumstances. We observe the performance of three strategy evaluation schemes, the history-dependent wealth game, the trend-opposing minority game, and the trend-following majority game, in a stock market where the price is exogenously determined. The price is either directly adopted from the real stock market indices or generated with a Markov chain of order $\le 2$. Each scheme's success is quantified by average wealth accumulated by the traders equipped with the scheme. The wealth game, as it learns from the history, shows relatively good performance unless the market is highly unpredictable. The majority game is successful in a trendy market dominated by long periods of sustained price increase or decrease. On the other hand, the minority game is suitable for a market with persistent zig-zag price patterns. We also discuss the consequence of implementing finite memory in the scoring processes of strategies. Our findings suggest under which market circumstances each evaluation scheme is appropriate for modeling the behavior of real market traders.
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